



précis

n. a concise summary of essential points, statements, or facts

précis Interviews Regina Bateson

Regina Bateson, assistant professor of political science at MIT, discusses civil war, crime, and Latin American politics. She also explains how she helps students incorporate qualitative methods in their research and how fieldwork informs her work.

Bateson joined the Department of Political Science in July 2013, after completing her PhD at Yale University. She received a BA from Stanford University, and previously served as a Foreign Service Officer for the U.S. Department of State.



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Making in America

by Suzanne Berger

Over the past decade, as close to 6 million manufacturing jobs disappeared, pessimism about the future of production swept across America. The brightest corporate superstars...were locating production abroad and still reaping...profits within America. Was this the model for the future?



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Selective Leviathans

by Sameer Lalwani

Why do states choose brutal or minimalist strategies to fight rebellion despite persistent or repeated failure? Understanding the strategic logic of these incumbents in civil war...is essential for policymakers to anticipate states' destabilizing strategies, stem spillovers, and restructure incentives to mitigate violence.



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OF NOTE

Gavin Begins Work as Stanton Chair

Francis Gavin is MIT's first Frank Stanton Chair in Nuclear Policy Studies, on the strength of a \$5 million endowment from the Stanton Foundation.

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Tirman on the U.S.–Iran Relationship

Tirman is the co-editor of a new book, *U.S.–Iran Misperceptions: A Dialogue*, which features essays by scholars and policymakers from both countries. He recently talked with *MIT News* about the topic.

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Former PM of Sri Lanka Joins CIS

Ranil Wickremesinghe has been named a Robert E. Wilhelm fellow. The Sri Lankan politician joined CIS for one month beginning April 8, 2014.

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Regina Bateson

Assistant Professor
MIT Department of Political Science



Regina Bateson
Assistant Professor of Political Science, MIT
Photo courtesy Stuart Darsch

précis: How did you become interested in civil war, crime, and Latin American politics?

RB: I first became interested in Latin America. I studied abroad in Argentina while in high school, had always taken Spanish, and in college I did an internship in Chile and worked for a professor researching the Salvadoran civil war. Then after college, I joined the Foreign Service. I was interested in going somewhere other than Latin America, like to French-speaking Africa or to Asia. But I knew Spanish very well, and a lot of people in Latin America apply for visas every year, so I got assigned to Guatemala.

In some ways, Guatemala found me as much as I found Guatemala. I did some training in D.C. first, then worked in the U.S. embassy in Guatemala City. It was almost impossible not to become interested in how crime was reshaping daily life there. People around you are constantly victims of crimes, you're often witnessing crimes, and talk of crime is just a national pastime. I also had some pre-existing interests in civil wars and post-conflict reconstruction. So before I arrived, I went on Amazon and ordered every book I could find on the Guatemalan Civil War.

When I got there, I was really interested in traveling around the country and trying to understand what, if anything, the civil war had to do with the explosion of violent crime in post-war Guatemala. I was immediately perplexed when I found that the areas of the country that had been devastated by civil war were also the safest parts of the country today. My assumption was that there was a massive crime problem and that clearly the areas affected by war would be the most violent. I got really interested in this puzzle, and this is the puzzle that drove me to go to grad school. At the time, only a few people were writing about crime in Latin America. And for some reason, people

weren't studying crime as it related to politics. So that's how I got interested in Latin America, crime, and civil wars.

précis: This spring, you've been teaching a course on qualitative methods. What do you view as the most important takeaways for students incorporating qualitative methods in their research?

RB: A large part of the class, and what I hope will be most valuable, is gaining actual experience. So the students in the class are doing projects in Cambridge or Boston—finding a research site, negotiating access to the site, visiting regularly, and doing participant observation, interviews, and focus groups. And as the semester has progressed, we've been doing workshop sessions where we all read and evaluate, in detail, students' interview transcripts and their participant observation exercises. My hope is that the practical component of the class will be very useful for students doing fieldwork in the future.

There are always unexpected challenges when you're starting a qualitative research project. So my hope is that students get experience doing those things now—when their dissertation research is not on the line. It's funny that we send people out to do fieldwork, by themselves, without any guidance, when they're under a lot of pressure because they have only one year of funding. My hope is that with these initial forays in the field, students can learn from each other's projects, and students will get more comfortable doing types of qualitative fieldwork that might be out of their comfort zone, like getting some experience interviewing people who are strangers, dealing with respondents who are not being forthcoming, and figuring out which questions "work." So the one thing I hope they take away from the class is having some concrete preparation for fieldwork.

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précis: Tell us a little bit about what you have in mind for the courses you would like to teach next year and in the future.

RB: So far, I like the qualitative methods class a lot and I'm planning to teach it again next spring. In the fall, I plan to teach an introduction to Latin American politics class for the undergrads and to co-teach scope and methods for the graduate students with Rich Nielsen. In the future, in terms of graduate seminars, I've thought about teaching Latin American politics and offering seminars on collective action or on rule of law and politics. I'm also interested in teaching on civil war and conflict, although for the moment that's pretty well covered by the department.

précis: In your own work, you've combined in-depth case studies, quantitative analysis, surveys and fieldwork. How, in particular, has fieldwork informed your research?

RB: On methods in general, my approach is to be question driven. So I start with a research question I'm interested in, which usually does not fit neatly with a research design that would be completely ideal for the purposes of causal identification. There is often not a natural experiment available, and for a lot of questions I'm interested in, you can't do field experiments. Plus, there's often a heavy amount of endogeneity. My approach to choosing methods is to try to fit the methods to suit the question and to find the best data that's available, or can be gathered, and move forward from there. I feel that grad students are often paralyzed when they feel they have a perfect question, but don't have the perfect causal identification strategy. But my approach is to just take the best approach you can with the data that's available, and that can be surprisingly successful. I do always have my eyes open for random exogenous shocks that lend themselves to subjects I'm interested in, but I've also done a lot of work on topics where causal identification is messy.

Part of the reason I'm more question driven and empirically driven comes from

my fieldwork. I've spent a lot of time in the field, like the internship I did in Chile when I was in college. For the internship, there was a Chilean government ministry working with micro-finance projects for agricultural improvement and production ventures in poor communities across Chile. The projects were failing in this one community, so my internship was to go to this rural community by myself and interview people to find out why the projects weren't working. That was my first real fieldwork experience. When I was in Guatemala, visa interviewing was a bit different, but you do get a lot of experience asking people uncomfortable questions. I also did a lot of traveling, talking to people in the Peace Corps, and people in the communities, to try and find out in an informal way what was going on in terms of crime there.

My dissertation involved a lot of fieldwork and interviewing and participant observation. The thing I think all those things contribute to is motivation. I feel most motivated to pursue a real research question when I see an actual connection to people's lives. And having questions informed from field experience makes subsequent academic work easier. If there's a good fit between your research passions and the things the people you're researching are passionate about, the research is going to be the most productive for everyone. You're going to get buy-in, they'll find it much more rewarding, and the ultimate project is going to be more relevant to them also. So, to me, that's the main way that fieldwork informs my work.

précis: How has your work evolved since arriving at MIT? What do you see as the unique opportunities for work on civil war, crime, and Latin American politics at the Institute?

RB: I'm thrilled to be at MIT's political science department. Whenever people from outside ask me how it's going, there's one word I always use, and that's "idyllic." It's the best place in the country to be a junior faculty member, especially working on the topics I work on. I've been very impressed by the collegiality, the size of the department, investments

in the graduate program, and in the courses. There's a lot of communication across subfields, between junior and senior faculty, and among junior faculty themselves—and that's unusual. I've really benefited from the cross-fertilization across subfields. People have very substantive interactions all the time, and that's very exciting. All the faculty members have lunch together on Thursdays, and people actually come!

Also, there's a great community of Latin Americanists and those working on conflict studies. And I really appreciate resources at MIT outside of the department. The Center for International Studies has been very supportive in sponsoring visits by outside speakers and other events, along with the Security Studies Program. And then the Department of Urban Studies and Planning (DUSP) is also a great resource, because they've historically had a strong program in international development and violence in Latin American cities. In the past, I had worked with some of their grad students even before coming to MIT, and those are people I'd like to continue collaborating with in the future.

précis: Turning now to your substantive interests, what steps do you see Guatemala taking in attempting to bring its high level of violent crime under control? Are there any policy implications from your research that the Guatemalan government has been, or should be, adopting?

RB: I should start by saying that the Guatemalan government has made a lot of progress recently in addressing some of the problems related to violent crime in the country. For the last several years, there has been an entity called the Comisión Internacional contra la Impunidad en Guatemala (CICIG) operating in Guatemala (in English, the International Commission Against Impunity in Guatemala). It's a very interesting body—a collaboration between the UN, other international donors, and the Guatemalan government. But it's not a court. It doesn't have the ability to try anyone or punish them, but it functions like an

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What's Next for Ukraine?

Peter Dizikes, MIT News Office

The Center hosted a Starr Forum “What’s Next for Ukraine” on March 14. Guest speakers included John Herbst, Director of the Center for Complex Operations at National Defense University and the former ambassador to Ukraine; Eugene Fishel, Division Chief in the Office of Russian and Eurasian Analysis of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research at the Department of State; Oxana Shevel, Associate Professor of Political Science at Tufts University; and Carol Saivetz, Research Affiliate at MIT Security Studies Program. Chairing the discussion was Barry Posen, Director of the MIT Security Studies Program and Ford International Professor of Political Science.



Pro-Russian protesters in Donetsk, March 8, 2014. *Courtesy Wikipedia Commons*

The political conflict between Russia and Ukraine continues to evolve rapidly: On Sunday, citizens in Crimea voted to secede from Ukraine and become part of Russia—a referendum other countries have said they will not recognize.

A group of experts on the region suggested during a public forum at MIT on Friday that the path forward is fraught with hurdles for everyone, not just Western leaders trying to impede Russia’s attempts to annex Crimea.

“There is considerable room for miscalculation all the way around,” said Eugene Fishel, division chief in the Office of Russian and Eurasian Analysis in the U.S. State Department’s Bureau of Intelligence and Research.

While Western leaders are scrambling to find a way to limit Russia’s actions, some of the panelists suggested that Russia could incur serious long-term costs from economic sanctions or reduced access to capital. Meanwhile, other former Soviet republics could become wary of their giant neighbor’s ambitions.

The event—“Ukraine: What’s Next?”—was part of the Starr Forum series of public discussions hosted by MIT’s Center for International Studies. Barry Posen, the Ford International Professor of Political Science, and director of MIT’s Security Studies Program, moderated the panel.

What Is Next?

Crimea has deep linguistic and social ties to Russia, but is geographically contiguous with Ukraine. Russian President Vladimir Putin has asserted that the Russian-speaking population in Crimea has been put at risk by radical groups in Ukraine; in recent weeks, Russian troops have massed along the Ukrainian border. For its part, Ukraine has little military capacity to wield in its own defense.

“Any [U.S.] sanctions, while useful, will not be nearly as persuasive as European sanctions,” said John Herbst, former U.S. ambassador to Ukraine.

Western governments, including that of U.S. President Barack Obama, have weighed imposing various kinds of economic sanctions against Russia and its ruling elite as a means of limiting Russian actions. However, America’s clout may be limited.

“Any [U.S.] sanctions, while useful, will not be nearly as persuasive as European sanctions,” said John Herbst, who served as the U.S. ambassador to Ukraine from 2006 to 2009. After all, Herbst noted, many of Russia’s financial dealings are with European countries, and high-level Russian political leaders and businesspeople have more of their assets in Europe.

But other panelists thought that sanctions could impose a steep long-term cost on Russia.

“I think it’s very costly to Russia in the long run,” said Carol Saivetz, a scholar of Russian policy and a research affiliate at MIT’s Security Studies Program, referring to the threat of economic sanctions and the prospect of capital flight. Recent movements of Russian financial markets, Saivetz added, shows there are “economic costs even from fear of what the crisis might bring.”

Saivetz also suggested that nearby countries might ask themselves, “Is this a sign for the future?” On the one hand, she said, “I don’t think Putin wants to re-create the Soviet Union.” But she added that Russian leaders appear to have a “fear of people power,” and also appear to blame the West “for the so-called colored revolutions” in numerous countries, including Ukraine, in recent years.

The current conflict was triggered, in part, by the events of last November, when public protests broke out in Ukraine after then-president Viktor Yanukovich declined to sign a political agreement with the European Union. Protests continued in 2014, causing Yanukovich to depart office, with new elections scheduled for May.

Whatever the response of Western countries to the events in Crimea, Fishel said, the idea of one European country wresting territory from another should give observers pause in considering the larger geopolitical trajectory of the region.

“I don’t think we ... understand the full impact of what Russia is doing to Ukraine right now,” Fishel said. ■

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Making in America: From Innovation to Market

Suzanne Berger



Suzanne Berger is Raphael Dorman-Helen Starbuck Professor of Political Science. She co-chairs the new Production in the Innovation Economy project. Photo courtesy Stuart Darsch

Over the past decade, as close to 6 million manufacturing jobs disappeared, pessimism about the future of production swept across America. The brightest corporate superstars, like Apple, were locating production abroad and still reaping the lion's share of profits within the United States. Was this the model for the future? In emerging technology sectors, like batteries and solar and wind power, even when the start-ups were created in the United States out of U.S. innovations, commercialization of the technology was taking place abroad. What could Americans do to leverage their strengths in new science and technology to rebuild a dynamic economy? Would production capabilities at home be needed to capture the flow of benefits from invention and entrepreneurship? Which capabilities? And how could they be created and sustained?

The MIT Production in the Innovation Economy Project


At the end of the 1980s, MIT president Paul Gray had asked faculty members from across the Institute to analyze the causes of slow productivity growth in the United States. *Made in America* (1989) became a landmark in public debates about the U.S. economy.¹ With that legacy in mind, MIT president Susan Hockfield in 2010 launched the MIT Production in the Innovation Economy (PIE) research group. Twenty faculty members and a dozen students joined. Its findings are reported in two recent books: Suzanne Berger and the MIT Production in the Innovation Economy Taskforce, *Making in America: From Innovation to Market* and Richard Locke and Rachel Wellhausen, editors, *Production in the Innovation Economy*. The objective was to analyze how innovation flows from ideas through production into the economy. Innovation is critical for economic growth and for a vibrant and productive society. The question was: What kinds of production do we need—and where do they need to be located—to sustain an innovative economy?

There are many reasons to worry about American manufacturing. Even though the U.S. share of world manufactured output has held fairly steady over the past decade, this reflects good results in only a few industrial sectors. In high-tech sectors the output of U.S. high-tech manufacturing is still the largest in the world but the U.S. share of this world market has been declining. Jobs are another huge concern. Manufacturing jobs were once especially valuable for workers and middle-class opportunity because they paid higher wages with better benefits than other jobs available to people with high-school education or less. National security is also linked to manufacturing through the procurement of new weapons and the maintenance and replacement parts for old equipment still in service. The disappearance of many suppliers creates greater dependence on foreign firms.

Across the entire industrial landscape there are gaping holes and missing pieces. Resources like training, collaboration between firms and universities, qualified suppliers, industrial consortia, and technical research centers are essential complements to the in-house capabilities of firms. The abundance of such resources distinguishes a fertile industrial ecosystem from a depleted and arid regional system. Today across much of the United States, small and medium-sized companies operate with only the resources they generate internally. Outside of such places as Silicon Valley, Austin, Texas, and Cambridge, Massachusetts, the industrial ecosystem cannot support the rate of innovation to market needed for a dynamic U.S. economy.

Over the past thirty years, national borders have opened to freer flows of ideas, goods, services, capital, and production. For many goods and services, international manufacturing contractors bring innovation into production. U.S. innovators have unprecedented-

ed opportunities to utilize production facilities that they do not have to build themselves. For the first time in the history of the industrial world, innovators in developing economies can connect with partners and suppliers at home and abroad and leap to niches close to the technological frontier.



*Making in America, by Suzanne Berger.
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permission from the author.*

*“With the interviews and
analyses we have now
carried out, there is a
clearer picture of what
takes place within the
black box of American
manufacturing innovation
and commercialization.”*

But there are long-term risks in these relationships that go beyond the loss of proprietary knowledge and trade secrets. The danger is that as companies shift the commercialization of their technologies abroad, their capacity for initiating future rounds of innovation will be weakened. That’s because much learning takes place as companies move their ideas beyond prototypes, demonstration, and pilot production into commercialization. Learning takes place as engineers and technicians on the factory floor come back with their problems to the design engineers and struggle with them to find better resolutions; as tacit knowledge is converted into standardized and codified processes; as end-users come back with complaints that need to be fixed. When production moves out, the terrain for future learning—and for profits and jobs—shrinks. Looking even further down the food chain beneath the companies to the laboratories that generate innovations in the first place, we saw reasons to fear that the loss of companies that can make things will end up in the loss of research that can invent them.

The PIE research basically asked one big question: what are the production capabilities here and abroad that contribute to sustaining innovation and realizing its benefits? We looked at innovation in products, in processes, in combinations of products and services; at innovation in start-ups, in large multinationals, in Main Street small and medium-sized manufacturers, in European and Asian partners and competitors, in hotspots for new technologies, like the biotech cluster of Cambridge, Massachusetts, in traditional manufacturing country, like Ohio, and in new manufacturing areas in the Southwest, in Arizona, in China, and in Germany.

We tried to identify the processes by which innovation comes to market by tracing all the steps that a firm takes to procure the capital, labor, facilities, and expertise that are required to commercialize a new product and service. For this, we carried out much of the research in firm-level interviews. NSF statistics for 2006–08 report that 22 percent of all U.S. manufacturing firms had “a new or significantly improved product, service or process” but we really did not know what they were doing or how they were doing it.² With the interviews and analyses we have now carried out, there is a clearer picture of what takes place within the black box of American manufacturing innovation and commercialization.

Even revolutionary technologies take long to commercialize. It took DuPont ten years to develop lab discoveries in polymers into full-scale nylon production in 1940. Today, as discoveries move along equally lengthy trajectories toward the market, we need to learn whether in-house manufacturing or manufacturing at a nearby contractor or manufacturing anywhere in the world does better or worse in accelerating the passage from lab to customer; whether ownership of manufacturing alters the distribution of benefits; and who learns what in the process and is in the best position to apply it to bringing the next discovery to life in the world. The interviews carried out in start-ups, Main Street manufacturers, and Fortune 500 companies, the skills survey of manufacturing establishments, and the scan of advanced manufacturing technologies that are on the near horizon have all informed the analysis and policy recommendations in the two PIE books.

The Great Transformation

From the 1980s on, the large corporations that had long dominated American manufacturing began to shed many of their business functions from R&D and design through detailed design to manufacturing and after-sales services.³ Financial markets pressed companies to focus on “core competences.” By 2013 very few large American companies

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remain with vertically integrated structures. First among the business functions that companies moved out of their own corporate walls was manufacturing—because that produced reductions in headcount and in capital costs that stock markets immediately rewarded. Advances in digitization and modularity in the 1990s made it possible to carry out this strategy and to outsource production to manufacturing subcontractors like Flextronics and Jabil and eventually to foreign suppliers and contractors like Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company, Quanta, and Foxconn.

- Vertically much of the manufacturing workforce. Long job tenure meant companies could recover their investment in training over the course of an employee's career. Today, American manufacturing firms are on average smaller, and have fewer resources. They do not employ workers for life. They cannot afford to, or, in any event, do not, train. How do we educate the workforce we need?

- Vertically integrated enterprises like AT&T used to support long-term basic research in centers like Bell Labs. As corporate structures shrank, basic research was drastically cut, and these centers disappeared. Corporate R&D is now far more tightly linked to the near-term needs of the business units. When innovation grew out of large firms, they had the resources to scale up to mass commercialization. Today, when innovation emerges in start-ups or university or government labs, where does finance for scale-up come from beyond the initial years of venture funding?

- Big American corporations in effect provided public goods through spillovers of research, training, diffusion of new technology to suppliers, and pressure on state and local governments to improve infrastructure. These spillovers constituted “complementary capabilities” that others could draw on, even if they had not contributed to creating them. As these “complementary capabilities” dried up, large holes in the industrial ecosystem have appeared.

The PIE research identified these holes in the industrial ecosystem—or market failures—as the single most challenging obstacle to creating and sustaining production capabilities in the United States that enable innovation to come to market. These gaps in the industrial ecosystem have been hollowed out by the disappearance of suppliers under pressure from global competition and by the disappearance of local capabilities that large corporations once provided as part of their own business operations. When new inputs are needed, like different skills, financing, and components, firms cannot efficiently produce all of them in-house. Even start-up companies with great novel technologies and generous venture backing cannot do it alone, we found. They need suppliers, qualified production workers and engineers, expertise beyond their own. Mid-sized manufacturers find little beyond their own internal resources when they develop new projects. They're “home alone.” This environment is far different from that of the German manufacturers we interviewed, who are embedded in dense networks of trade associations, suppliers, technical schools, and applied research centers all within easy reach.

What's to Be Done?

The PIE research points to one urgent objective for U.S. policy: rebuilding the industrial ecosystem with capabilities that firms from multiple sectors could combine with their own when they try to bring new ideas into the market. The mechanisms through which these public goods could be created involve coordination among private and public actors. In such initiatives, a private company or a public institution performs a convening function. The initiative usually starts with the “convenor” putting new resources on the table for use by others on condition that they too contribute to the pot. One well-known example is the SEMATECH Consortium that the semiconductor manufacturers and equipment makers formed in 1987 with financing initially from the federal government and today from industry and New York state. In Ohio, a company we studied was

a convenor when it moved its coating laboratory and personnel into a local university and offered other companies the opportunity to use the facilities if they, too would contribute to its operation. New degree programs were also created at the university. We found cases in which a public intermediary provides coordination. In Springfield, Massachusetts, when a machining trade association faced a shortage of skilled workers as the result of the closing of large local companies that had previously trained apprentices, it approached the Regional Employment Board, which brought firms together with vocational high schools and community colleges to sponsor new training.

The first National Manufacturing Innovation Institute, the National Additive Manufacturing Innovation Institute (NAMII) in Youngstown, Ohio, offers companies, universities, and government agencies a way to distribute and reduce the risks of investing in 3D printing technologies. When gains from innovation are significant but distributed thinly across many firms, it's unlikely that any single one of them will invest enough to bring it to life. NAMII offers potential ways to induce collaboration and spread its risks.

Many cases of coordination we examined are recent, so we do not know which will work. If they have a real chance, it's because what's held manufacturing in the United States in the last resort—even as so much turned against it—was the advantage firms gain from proximity to innovation and proximity to users. Even in a world linked by big data and instant messaging, the gains from colocation have not disappeared. If we can learn from these ongoing experiments in linking innovation to production, new streams of growth can flow out of industrial America. ■

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- 2 National Science Board, "Science and Engineering Indicators 2012."
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Gavin Begins Work as First Frank Stanton Chair

by Peter Dunne, Political Science

Politics has been part of human culture, and the subject of scholarly inquiry, for millennia. But only 70 years have passed since the epochal arrival of nuclear weapons, and our understanding of nuclear proliferation, deterrence, and arms control, and their complex relationships with traditional political issues, is still a work in progress.

The Department of Political Science and its interdisciplinary Security Studies Program (part of the Center for International Studies) have been deeply engaged with these topics since the 1970s. 2014 marks a major extension of this engagement, with the appointment of Francis Gavin as the first Frank Stanton Chair in Nuclear Policy Studies, on the strength of a \$5 million endowment from the Stanton Foundation.



*Francis J. Gavin is the first Frank Stanton Chair in Nuclear Security Policy studies and Professor of Political Science at MIT.
Photo courtesy Stuart Darsch*

“We’re in a renaissance of nuclear studies now, and MIT is at the center of it—a majority of the scholars whose work I most admire have come from this program,” says Gavin, who joins the Institute after 14 years at the University of Texas at Austin, where he launched and led the Robert S. Strauss Center for International Security and Law and served as the first Tom Slick Professor of International Affairs at the Lyndon B. Johnson School of Public Affairs.

“The Security Studies Program brings together scientists and the engineering community; military people who have to deal with the realities of command and control, custody, and training; and people who worry about diplomacy and the politics that surround it,” Gavin says. “It’s a truly interdisciplinary environment, and it makes me feel like a student all over again.”

Gavin earned PhD and master’s degrees from the University of Pennsylvania, a master’s degree from Oxford, and a bachelor’s degree from the University of Chicago, and he has held numerous fellowships, including posts at Harvard’s Kennedy School of Government and Center for International Affairs and a senior research fellowship at the Nobel Institute in Norway. He began work at MIT in January, and he is planning to teach graduate and undergraduate classes on nuclear politics and history and on international security and U.S. foreign policy.

He is also eager to encourage and facilitate “research that has true policy relevance—on front-page issues like Iran and North Korea,” he says. “Our scholarship can help policymakers create better policies.” To this end, he hopes to connect MIT with the Strauss Center’s Nuclear Studies Research Initiative,

"I'm convinced that to understand international politics, you have to understand history and think historically," says Gavin. "What's so gratifying is that everyone in the department seems to agree, and that's rare."

which fosters collaboration among historians, political scientists, and policymakers.

The new chair honors distinguished CBS executive Frank Stanton, who was introduced to nuclear issues while serving on a presidential panel in 1954. Stanton's assignment was to develop a plan for maintaining national and international communications following a nuclear attack.

"The Stanton Foundation has provided incredible opportunities to develop better understanding of nuclear dangers, not just for me but for senior scholars at other universities, and for younger scholars with their fellowships," Gavin says.

The appointment of Gavin is somewhat unconventional, as he is a historian by training rather than a political scientist. "I don't know that there's another political science department in the country that would do that; it shows why MIT is such an extraordinary place," says Gavin, whose recently published "Nuclear Statecraft: History and Strategy in America's Atomic Age" draws on years of research into declassified archival documents to challenge conventional assumptions about how U.S. nuclear policy was developed.

"There was a sense among many of the great thinkers that the larger issues of nuclear dynamics were resolved 40 years ago," says Gavin, "but they weren't, and still aren't, and probably won't be. Wrestling with complex technical issues is often a challenge in the policy world and in a democracy, whether it's the National Security Agency, cyber warfare, or nuclear technology. It's important to understand the technology, but also to understand that everything is done in a political context, and frankly, it's the political context that matters more—politics always trumps technology."

With this in mind, Gavin says he hopes to expose students and researchers to the historian's thought process and methods, including quantitative and formal tools. "I'm convinced that to understand international politics, you have to understand history and think historically," he says. "What's so gratifying is that everyone in the department seems to agree, and that's rare. It's a big part of why this is my dream job—having the smartest colleagues and the best grad students, working in a friendly, collaborative organizational culture, and living in an area that's a Hollywood for intellectual life." ■

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Selective Leviathans: *Explaining State Strategies of Counterinsurgency and Consolidation*

by Sameer Lalwani



Sameer Lalwani is a PhD candidate in political science at MIT where he is an affiliate of the Security Studies Program.

In the second half the twentieth century, civil wars eclipsed inter-state war as the “far greater scourge” in terms of death toll, duration, and occurrence and with it, a host of new conflict puzzles emerged.¹ One puzzling feature is that many states seem to defy normative, political, or strategic incentives and choose costly, heavy-handed, counterinsurgency methods, producing high levels of violence and civilian casualties.² Recent work finds that only 11% of 20th century counterinsurgency campaigns sought to protect civilians,³ and even incumbents that provided the model for Western counterinsurgency doctrine regularly departed from strategies of minimal force. A separate but related puzzle is the seemingly casual, haphazard, and limited manner with which states go about fighting rebellion, evidenced by the high number of civil conflicts left as “draws”⁵ or with enduring “low-activity,” particularly in Asia.⁶ While outcomes are generally murky, states will often persist with costly, unsuccessful strategies. *Why then do states choose brutal or minimalist strategies to fight rebellion despite persistent or repeated failure?* Understanding the strategic logic of these incumbents in civil war—like when they escalate and when they under react—is essential for policymakers to anticipate states’ destabilizing strategies, stem spillovers, and restructure incentives to mitigate violence.

Due to limited prior work on the subject, my research seeks to explain why states choose a certain *type* of strategy to fight rebellion. I argue that strategy is shaped by a core-periphery relationship prior to rebellion—that is, between the state’s geopolitical core and the contested region, as well as between the state elites and the identity group rebelling.

Conceptualizing Counterinsurgency Strategies

The first step of this project was to theorize types of strategy or the range of values an incumbent’s counterinsurgency strategy can take on. Much of current work focuses on *whether* states fight rather than *how*⁷ or by treating all incumbent counterinsurgency strategies the same.⁸ But the persistence of the empirical puzzles described earlier suggests more than one approach to fight rebellion, a variation found not only between states but also within states.

Based on a review of military strategy, counterinsurgency, and numerous cases of states fighting rebellion, I identified two critical dimensions of strategy—the level of effort invested and the level of violence employed⁹—and from high/low combinations of these two dimensions, I derived four ideal type strategies: attrition, population security, enfeeblement, and cooptation. These strategies can be distinguished by their theories of victory, signature tactics, selection of tradeoffs, and the relative levels of casualties, manpower, money and materiel involved.

Core-Periphery Relations: Explaining Varied State Strategies

What then might explain varied state strategies in different cases of rebellion? Prevailing theories of strategy rely on state strength, regime type, or culture but have little purchase in explaining sub-national variation—that is, the same state fighting differently over time or across regions. To explain state strategy, I develop a theory based on a country’s core-periphery relations—that is, a state’s relative *value of territory* and the embattled rebel identity group’s *positional status* within the state.

First, I argue the variation in the state incumbent’s level of effort is explained by the state’s value of the contested territory. The incumbent will spare no effort when rebels contest or threaten core territory—a region of high value and strategic importance measured by the level of integration, productivity, and physical and social infrastructure

present. Rebels in under-valued, non-strategic peripheral zones will generally elicit low levels of state effort in either an enfeeblement or cooptation strategy intended to contain but not defeat rebellion. One exception is if rebels manage to project force on to core areas, then incumbents will be sufficiently motivated to exert greater effort and defeat them since valued territory is threatened. A state has plenty of incentives to confront rebels with force, but peripheral territories do not provide strong incentives for decisive strategies. The costliness of sustaining a lengthy, resource-intensive campaign and building up a dominant state presence to control peripheries can be prohibitive and cause a state to balk at such a venture, conserve its resources, and deploy a minimalist strategy that merely limits conflict intensity below a certain threshold.

Second, I draw from social identity theory and ethnic conflict studies of inter-group bias¹⁰ to argue that the positional status of the rebels' identity group can shape and constrain the level of violence the state is willing to employ. An identity group esteemed by the state with high positional status—most discernable through state elites' assessments of that group's character as well as its representation within state institutions like the security forces and civil bureaucracy—will incentivize the state to choose a less violent and more discriminate strategy. Both affective and strategic mechanisms guide this choice of restraint. State officials advising or leading the counterinsurgency campaign are more likely to empathize with valued groups, even if they are minorities, rendering the state sensitive to the groups' grievances, concerned about indiscriminate violence, and willing to embrace military restraint and address the “demand-side” of rebellion. If security forces are composed of high numbers from the rebels' identity groups, the incumbent will be more vulnerable to backlashes—like desertion or mutiny—that pose strategic threats to cohesion. Co-ethnic representation in state institutions can also offer the state greater information and trust to substitute more discriminate targeting, credible bargaining, and the redressing of grievances for high violence within a military campaign.

Context: South Asia

South Asia offers a compelling context within which to examine these questions and test my theory of state counterinsurgency strategy. It contains a significant number of rebellions, both historic and ongoing, with tremendous subnational variation that exhibits many of the puzzles detailed above. There are also observable differences in strategies employed by the same state incumbent, and enough observations to control for a host of other factors that might influence strategy. Moreover, South Asia has become far more consequential for U.S. foreign policy, not only since 9/11, but also in the “pivot” towards Asia.

I tested my argument in 13 campaigns from India, 15 campaigns from Pakistan, and 7 campaigns from Sri Lanka. The approach allows for tightly paired comparisons, longitudinal analysis in the same conflict region, and in-depth case studies to process-trace decision-making, but also sufficient observations to establish distinct patterns. My analysis was based on a close scrutiny of the case literature, extensive data collection on the regions and rebel identity groups, and nearly half a year of fieldwork in Pakistan, India, the Kashmir Valley, and the British archives. I also drew on new sources of information, such as micro-level and time-series data, local journals and newspapers, government reports, military service journals and doctrinal works, officials' memoirs, and over 140 semi-structured interviews, more than half with retired high-level officials from the civil service, military, or police.

Findings

My research confirmed that core-periphery relations had a major effect on incumbent strategy, even when controlling for macro-structural features like state-strength, regime type, and organizational culture, which would undoubtedly have some influence on strategic choices. I found that both threatened territory and rebel identity were conse-

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Selective Leviathans:

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quential in shaping a state incumbent's strategy. High valued or strategic territories that were contested or threatened by rebels elicited high effort responses by the state (attrition or population security). The Indian state exerted far greater effort when rebellions threatened its economically and strategically valuable regions of Punjab and Kashmir than nearly all other counterinsurgency campaigns. The Pakistani state did the same in Sindh and Bangladesh and the Sri Lankan state in its Western and Southern provinces. Additionally, low positional status elicited strategies of high violence (enfeeblement or attrition) against rebels and their civilian base. The highest levels of violence were employed by India against Northeast tribal and Kashmiri Muslim rebels, by Pakistan against Bengali and Baluch rebellions, and by Sri Lanka against Tamil rebels, all groups with very low status and poor representation within the state.

Extensive qualitative evidence also validates a number of the theory's mechanisms. Even when rebelling, esteemed identity groups elicited greater empathy from state policy elites and sympathy for their grievances. These elites expressed their conviction in the group's loyalty save for hardcore insurgents, a desire for rehabilitation of many rebel combatants, and concern for the moral and strategic consequences of indiscriminate violence. They also held greater confidence in their ability to acquire better information or deploy tactical substitutes for violence to mitigate rebel support. This was the Indian state's response to Sikh rebels in Punjab, the Pakistani state's response to Pashtun rebels in the northwest, and the Sri Lankan state's response to Sinhalese rebels in the southwest. Meanwhile, state elites' disdain and broad suspicion of groups with low positional status led to perceptions of disloyalty and guilt by association allowing for higher levels of violence against combatants and civilians alike. Neither a group's positional status nor a territory's value are easily malleable, but both can gradually shift over extended periods of time as has been the case with the schedule castes and tribes of India or parts of Pakistan's northwest frontiers.

Implications

My research offers some unique but policy-relevant conclusions applicable beyond South Asia. First, states are more likely to deploy a minimalist approach against rebellions in undervalued regions that merely contains conflict below a certain threshold, sometimes yielding a steady-state of chronic, low-level warfare that policymakers term "ungoverned spaces." This novel, yet disturbing finding belies the commonly held assumption that civil war is the most costly enterprise states seek to avoid or quickly end, when, in fact, achieving a monopolization of violence is the far more daunting task. Additionally, despite numerous cross-national studies concluding that identity does not affect civil war dynamics, in these sub-national studies I find the positional status of an identity group is critical to explaining state strategy and levels of violence or restraint. The findings, moreover, are not limited to South Asia as my initial probes have found some evidence for this theory in conflicts from the Philippines, Colombia, Turkey, Russia, Indonesia, Iraq, and even Britain.

Furthermore, I find that democracy alone is not sufficient to restrain states from unleashing high levels of violence. India in 1990, Pakistan in 2010, and Sri Lanka in 2006 were all nominally democracies (and rated as such by the commonly used Polity index) when they unleashed brutal attrition campaigns involving high levels of violence in Kashmir, South Waziristan, and Tamil Eelam, respectively.

Finally, despite the often-theorized divergence of India's and Pakistan's state capacity, institutions, and democratic culture, it is striking how similar patterns of core-periphery relations have shaped their respective counterinsurgency strategies and patterns of conflict. It suggests that their colonial legacy of the British Raj—both its treatment of peripheral zones as well as favoring minority groups as martial races like the Pashtuns and


Sikhs—remains a powerful contemporary political force in South Asia, which shapes Indian and Pakistani state behavior to be far similar than generally acknowledged. ■

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3 Questions: John Tirman on the Warming U.S.–Iran Relationship

by Peter Dizikes, MIT News Office



U.S.-Iran Misperceptions: A Dialogue,
recently published by Bloomsbury Press.

The U.S. and Iran have had a largely antagonistic relationship since the Iranian Revolution of 1979. Could that be changing? In January, Iran and a U.S.-led group of six global powers agreed to an interim six-month deal that freezes Iran's nuclear weapons program, in exchange for the lifting of some economic sanctions. The progress on the issue indicates that U.S.-Iran difficulties are not wholly intractable, suggests John Tirman, a principal research scientist and executive director of MIT's Center for International Studies. Tirman is the co-editor of a new book on the subject, "U.S.-Iran Misperceptions: A Dialogue," recently published by Bloomsbury Press, which features essays by scholars and policymakers from both countries. Tirman recently talked with MIT News about the topic.

Q. What are the main misperceptions on both sides ?

A. Well, there are so many. On the Iranian side, it's their belief that the U.S. has been out to get them for 60 years. It's not without some foundation, but it's exaggerated. One of the things that I think is important to understand about the U.S.-Iran relationship is that for Iran, the U.S. really is the dominant nation in their foreign policy. This Iranian sense of foreigners meddling to harm the nation is extremely strong. That's the strongest misperception on the part of Iran.

On the United States side...I think the perception of Iran—and we looked very closely at polling in the United States over a period of time from the beginning of the 1980s—has been pretty consistent. The American public views Iran as unreliable, irrational, out to cause trouble, wanting a nuclear weapon, and being hostile to Israel. Some of those things are true. And those two sets of perceptions are very much alive today.

Q. If there are so many misunderstandings between these two nations, then what are some of the potential substantive areas of agreement that may be undervalued right now?

A. It's been said by many people, not just me, that the United States and Iran have many overlapping interests on which they could find agreement. Part of it is just an interest in bringing stability to the region. It's the Arab states and Afghanistan and Turkey that are really in flux. The interesting thing about Iran during the period of the Islamic Republic is that it has generally not been expansionist...it has an interest in asserting its regional power, but it has for the most part shown an interest in stability. And we should encourage that. One way to encourage that is to come with some sort of agreement on diplomatic relations, and then to get the nuclear deal done, which I think is quite feasible. And of course to lower the rhetoric about Israel, which I think they've been doing. All these things are important to the U.S.

Q. The U.S. and other countries want to inhibit Iran's capacity to produce nuclear weapons; in return, they might lift economic sanctions. We've just had an interim deal on this. What needs to happen for a permanent agreement to be reached?

A. First of all, where we are today compared to a year ago is like night and day. It's easy for people to forget that the change has been remarkable. You can see the change in just the simple fact that the U.S. and Iran can talk any day, and do often, and we have the interim agreement. The talks are constructive; they're not just hurling insults at each other, for the first time in 35 years.

That's the result of the Iranian election, but it's also the result of the choices [Iranian President Hassan] Rouhani has made. He's very knowledgeable about international affairs, was a nuclear negotiator, and chose, in my opinion, the best possible person to be foreign minister, Mohammad Javad Zarif, who was educated in the U.S. He knows America, and one of the things that's really different is not just ideology, it's familiarity. Zarif understands the American political system, and previous Iranian leaders didn't have that feel. When [members of Congress] blast away at Iran, Zarif, I assume, understands when that's old-fashioned pandering to a domestic constituency. [Iranian politicians] do the same thing; we just don't read about it that much. But that kind of thing used to be misinterpreted. So that's a huge change.

The agreement itself, and the apparent sincerity and determination of the Iranians to make it work, are good signs. And I give [John] Kerry a lot of credit; he's been indefatigable as secretary of state. He's lucky he got Zarif as his counterpart, but luck has to be converted into something—and he has done that. One of the things Kerry and [President Barack Obama] have done well is to address some of the difficult areas on enrichment. They did that in the interim agreement, and they're going to have to do it again and sell it to Congress.

The outlines of the deal have always been apparent. The U.S. wants to stop [Iran] from enriching uranium to 20 percent, because that's the launching pad, so to speak, to get to breakout capability [to produce weapons]—and to get Iran to walk back a couple of other pathways to weaponization, and be very transparent about it. So it's a matter of making that more permanent in the comprehensive agreement and working out areas that have been left hazy.

The hard part is going to be getting Congress to lift the economic sanctions. There are some, apparently, [that Obama] can suspend, but there are some that Congress has got to change, and that's going to be very hard. A comprehensive agreement has to be written with stages in mind: Iran does X, we verify, until confidence is built and a case can be made to lift the sanctions. Whether Iran can swallow that timeframe is one of the big questions. But we're moving in the right direction. ■

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Interview with Regina Bateson

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independent investigative body. So they have professional investigators, many of whom are international employees who cycle through the country, investigating organized crime in Guatemala, including crime with links to the government. Investigators in Guatemala don't get a lot of institutional support, or security for their own personal safety, so crimes against them usually aren't investigated very thoroughly. In addition, investigation is very complicated, because if you're in the police or working for the prosecutor's office, you never know if your bosses are participating in the criminal activity you're investigating, and there are numerous cases of prosecutors killing prosecutors, and police killing police, because one person started investigating activities that would implicate someone else in their own organization. So it's very difficult to investigate high-level organized crime in Guatemala.

Which is where CICIG comes into the picture. The idea is to gather evidence and investigate the organized crime that the government isn't investigating. So CICIG investigates cases where there's a great deal of risk associated with investigations. It's had some significant victories in some cases, and they've also been involved in vetting high-level appointees in Guatemala, where previously there wasn't any high-level vetting. Beyond actually investigating cases, the important contribution of CICIG is to start a different conversation in Guatemala and to show links between the state and organized crime, and to show that it's possible to investigate organized crime. And that kind of cuts through some of the hopelessness about the situation of crime in Guatemala. It's changed the tenor of the debate a bit.

The second significant change in Guatemala in the past several years involves a woman named Claudia Paz y Paz. She was appointed as Attorney General and has proved to be a crusading force. For years, the ministry had been dragging its feet on human rights cases lingering from the civil war era, there had been virtually no justice for victims of the genocide,

and people who perpetrated those crimes remained active in public life. So there really had not been a measure of domestic justice from the civil war era. She surprised people once in office. She took decisive action to actually move forward in prosecuting quite a few human rights cases from the civil war era, responded to requests to extradite officials to try them abroad, moved forward in the cases against Ríos Montt (the former president and dictator), and has just taken very decisive action against organized crime in the country. If there were more people like her, and more institutions in place to help people like her, then I think there would be some real hope for reducing crime in the country.

Less promising, however, is the current president, Pérez Molina. He's a military man, served during the civil war, and he was on the ground in some of the same municipalities where acts of genocide took place. His party, *Partido Patriota*, is most associated with the policy of "iron-fisted policing." At the time he won, I was there with Guatemalans, and the way all the reporters referred to him on election night was as "*El General*." It was very striking in this country where the government has always been dominated by the military and with decades of abuses committed by the military.

But there is this long succession of presidents who have involved the military more and more in policing, and this is very concerning in a number of ways. There has been this real re-militarization of Latin America that's going on right now—especially in Central America and Mexico—with the war on drugs. And the approach seems to be to increase the military's involvement or to make police more like militaries, and it remains to be seen what the consequences of this will be. It could have real consequences for the balance of power between military and civilian authorities. And it was only in the 1990's and 2000's that civilian leadership started to get some control over some of these militaries and I think the pendulum is shifting back a bit toward more resources to militaries

rather than civilian entities. We'll see how it plays out, but it doesn't seem very encouraging for the quality of democracy in the region.

précis: In light of these countervailing trends, what do you see as the biggest obstacle to further improving the policing situation?

RB: In Guatemala and the rest of Central America, there have been a ton of efforts to improve policing and there have been a lot of assumptions that high homicide rates are because of the poor quality of policing. People don't trust the police, cases aren't properly investigated, there's very little prosecution, and so there's been an assumption for a long time that if you could just improve the quality of policing and the quality of investigation, this would be a way of improving those institutions and lead to better policing practices that would drive down crime rates. But something really surprising to me in my research was that it's not just a matter of resources, or more training, or more courses in crime scene investigation, or higher pay, or increasing numbers, but in addition to those programs and that type of support, you also need to have political will. This is the phrase people used over and over again with me in interviews. It's a question of political will.

But some have suggested that at very high levels, the Guatemalan government doesn't want the police to be effective. With heads of police being prosecuted and with documented cases of their involvement in narco-trafficking and extrajudicial executions, and a very wide range of organized crime, it's not entirely far-fetched that those in charge do not want Guatemala's police to be very effective. And the second reason political actors may not want effective police is because the less effective the domestic police are, the better the case for involving the military in local policing. Civilians come to see the military as a solution of policing and security. But it's not really clear how policing by soldiers can strengthen the civilian justice system. Some people speculate that this is just

creating a parallel, military-run justice system and undermining solutions people have fought very hard to create for a long time.

précis: What are you working on now and what's next?

RB: So right now I'm working on a whole bunch of projects. First, I'm working on turning my dissertation into a book on social order after civil wars. While I have a lot of material from Guatemala, at this point I'm also hoping to include El Salvador and Nicaragua and look more broadly at how wartime institutions and norms about security and the use of violence affect the strategies that people choose to provide security after a war ends. People normally think that civil wars are associated with cultures of violence and post-war disorder. But even in areas with high crime rates, people don't passively sit back and submit to random violence, but normally take some measures to provide for their own security even in the absence of state-provided security. So in this way, civil wars can also contribute to order in the post-civil war period. Those are some of the themes I'm looking at.

Those are some of the themes I'm looking at. I'm also working on a separate article about the political logic of vigilantism, looking at how norms and past practices have been used for punishing crime and how pre-existing institutions shape the types of systems of vigilantism that emerge in different settings. In this project, I'm trying to apply the framework I developed in Guatemala to other contexts like Mexico, where groups are fighting narco-trafficking. Vigilantism is often presented as a community's natural response to crime, as the crime caused it to happen. My argument would be that it's not so obvious, especially when punishment is done in a public way, and when the types of violence used are often very intimate. So I'm trying to show with this article that when you look at acts of vigilantism, and understand how people are constructing threats, there's a reason why a particular triggering event is interpreted the way it is and causes the

type of vigilante responses we observe. The type of punishment people choose is typically not random. They're drawing on types of punishment that are often acceptable, drawing on some kind of script or template. And they also draw on existing leadership structures in the community. In Guatemala, for example, these structures are in large part related to the civil war, and this influences the type of vigilantism people use. So I'm hoping to take those insights from Guatemala and apply them a bit more broadly and show that vigilantism is political and should be of broader interest to political science. ■

U.S.-Iran Project Book Explores “Misperceptions”

The long-running U.S.–Iran Project, which has brought together policy makers from both countries to explore fraught periods in the relationship, has produced a second book, *U.S.–Iran Misperceptions: A Dialogue*, published in February by Bloombury Press. John Tirman, CIS executive director, is coeditor and coauthor with Abbas Maleki, a former Robert Wilhelm Fellow at the Center and associate professor of energy policy at Sharif University of Technology in Tehran. Other contributors include Robert Jervis, Hossein Mousavian, Huss Banai, Robert Rendon, Kayhan Barzegar, Steven Miller and Matthew Bunn. It is an unique format in which Iranians and Americans write about each others’ role in the Gulf, on nuclear matters, and other issues.

MISTI’s Perez Honored for Leadership

April Julich Perez, associate director of the MIT International Science and Technology Initiatives (MISTI) has been honored for her leadership with a 2014 MIT Excellence Award for Bringing Out the Best. “In her role at MISTI, April has distinguished herself in her ability to mentor, inspire, and empower each member of her staff—encouraging them to take on new responsibilities and supporting them every step of the way,” said Institute Community and Equity Officer Edmund Bertschinger, who presented Perez with the award at a ceremony held February 25.

SSP Wednesday Seminars

The Security Studies Program’s lunchtime lectures included: Benjamin Miller, University of Haifa, on “Competing Models of War and Peace: How Relevant are they in the Post–Cold War Era?”; Daniel Drezner, Tufts University, on “Does Military Power Attract Foreign Investment?”; Risa Brooks, Marquette University, on “Societies and Terrorist Violence: How Community Ties Influence Militant Groups’ Targeting of Civilians”; and Fred Kaplan, Slate Magazine on “America and the World in the Age of Obama.”

Luvisi, Nhuch Receive Infinite Mile Awards

Two CIS staff members have been awarded Infinite Mile awards for 2014. Susan Luvisi, administrative assistant for MISTI, received an “Unsung Hero” award and Michelle Nhuch, director of public programs, received a “Great Ideas” award. The Infinite Mile Awards were presented at a SHASS luncheon in May.

Starr Forums

The Center hosted multiple Starr Forums including: A film screening of “The Network” with Eva Orner (director) and Fotini Christi (MIT); “Ukraine: What’s Next?” With John Herbst (former ambassador to Ukraine), Eugene Fishel (State Department), Oxana Shevel (Tufts), Carol Saivetz (MIT), and Barry Posen (MIT); “Junk Food and the Modern Mind” with Captain Joseph Hibbeln (NIH), Rachel Gow (NIH, Lynn Todman (MIT); “Indian Ocean: The Vortex of Destiny” with Ranil Wickremesinghe (former prime minister of Sri Lanka and a Robert E. Wilhelm Fellow at CIS) and Ken Oye (MIT).

Myron Weiner Seminar Series on International Migration

This semester, the Center hosted a seminar on “Syrian Refugees in Jordan and Lebanon: Current and Looming Problems,” by Jennifer Leaning, Harvard School of Public Health and “Seeking Harmony between the Formal and Informal: Integrating Migrant Remittances for Post–Conflict Development” with John R Harris and Daivi Rodima–Tyalor, both from Boston University.

Bustani Middle East Seminar

The Emile Bustani Middle East Seminar hosted two talks: “The Ides of April: the presidential succession crisis and the dilemmas of the Algerian oligarchy,” with Hugh Roberts (Edward Keller Professor of North African and Middle Eastern History and Director, Middle Eastern Studies Program at Tufts University); and “The Nuclear Agreement with Iran and It’s Ramifications for the Regional Politics of the Middle East,” with Ali Banuazizi (Professor of Political Science at Boston College and Director of the Program of Islamic Civilization and Societies).

People

PhD Candidate **Noel Anderson** was awarded a Smith Richardson Foundation World Politics and Statecraft Fellowship and was accepted into the Tobin Project's fellowship and forum in National Security. He presented a paper, "Explaining Changing Trends in the Incidence of Civil War: External Military Assistance, Competitive Interventions, and the Duration of Intrastate Conflict," at the International Studies Association conference in Toronto in March, and a co-authored paper (with **Alec Worsnop**), "Battle Death Thresholds, Varieties of Violence, and Civil War Research: Reassessing the Link between Drug Cultivation and Intrastate Conflict," at the Harvard-MIT-Yale Political Violence Conference in New Haven in April.

Assistant Professor of Political Science **Regina Bateson** was featured in the MIT News, "Regina Bateson: Crime, punishment and politics: MIT political scientist studies the long-term effects of war on people's social and political behavior," in March.

PhD Candidate **Mark Bell** presented "Realism, Idealism, and American Public Opinion on Nuclear Disarmament" at the International Studies Association Annual Convention in Toronto in March, and "Beyond Emboldenment: The Effects of Nuclear Weapons on State Foreign Policy" at the Midwest Political Science Association Annual Conference in Chicago in April. He received a World Politics and Statecraft Fellowship from the Smith Richardson Foundation for field research in South Africa during the summer of 2014.

Suzanne Berger, the Raphael Dorman-Helen Starbuck Professor of Political Science, opened the Boston Review forum debate, "How Finance Guttled Manufacturing," in April.

In April, CIS Visitor **Wenxin Chen** participated as a member of the Chinese delegation in the 6th *U.S.-China Project on Crisis Avoidance & Cooperation* (PCAC) Track 1.5 Dialogue held at the United States Institute of Peace (USIP) in Washington, D.C. The Dialogue was co-hosted by USIP, China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations (CICIR), and Fudan University.

Professor of Political Science **Nazli Choucri** was featured in the MIT News, "Modeling Cyberspace Control Worldwide: Nazli Choucri analyzes issues of governance, politics, and participation in online communications," in March.

PhD Candidate **Christopher Clary** received a Project on Managing the Atom/International Security Program pre-doctoral research fellowship at the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at the Harvard Kennedy School for the 2014-2015 academic year.

Frank Stanton Chair in Nuclear Security Policy Studies **Francis Gavin's** profile was featured in the MIT News, "In major extension of MIT nuclear policy studies, Gavin begins work as first Frank Stanton Chair," in February.

PhD Candidate **Brian Haggerty** received an International Security Program pre-doctoral research fellowship at the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at the Harvard Kennedy School for the 2014-2015 academic year. In March, he presented "Strategic Sponsorship: Capability, Cohesion, and Control in State Support for Militant Groups," at

the International Studies Association Annual Convention in Toronto. He received a World Politics and Statecraft Fellowship from the Smith Richardson Foundation for field research in Lebanon during the summer of 2014.

In March, PhD Candidate **David Jae** presented his papers, “Untangling the War Puzzle: Alliances, Polarity, and Great Power War” and “Alliance Security as a Public Good: An Experimental Investigation” (co-authored with **Kai Quek**) at the International Studies Association Annual Convention in Toronto.

PhD Candidate **Sameer Lalwani** presented papers at the International Studies Association Annual Conference in Toronto in March and at the India Security Studies Workshop hosted by the University of Pennsylvania’s Center for Advanced Study of India in April. He also received a research grant from the Whiting Foundation and accepted a Stanton Nuclear Post-doctoral Fellowship for the 2014–2015 academic year at the RAND Corporation.

PhD Candidate **Nicholas Miller** served as a discussant at the International Studies Association Annual Convention in Toronto in March.

CIS Senior Researcher **Thomas Neff** was featured in a *New York Times* profile by William Broad, “From Warheads to Cheap Energy: Thomas L. Neff’s Idea Turned Russian Warheads into American Electricity” in January. He was also interviewed on NPR by Tom Ashbrook.

In March, PhD Candidate **Amanda Rothschild** presented “The Relative Gains Solution: Explaining Great Britain’s Decision to Suppress the Slave Trade,” and “Expanding Rights in Theory, Risking Protection in Practice: Does R2P Undermine the Genocide Convention?” at the International Studies Association Annual Convention in Toronto. She also gave the keynote address at the 2014 Boston College University Fellowships Dinner in May.

SSP Research Affiliate **Carol Saivetz** was featured on an NECN segment titled “Foreign policy expert: Russia should not take further action in Ukraine” in March.

In April, CIS Research Fellow **Mansour Salsabili** gave a talk, “The Persian Gulf Free Zone: An Institutional Analysis of Dynamics for Nonproliferation” at MIT’s Center for International Studies.

Ford International Professor of Political Science **Richard Samuels** is a Senior Advisor to a Lincoln Lab project on Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief that kicked off in April. The project is designed to develop methods to enhance command and control systems for relief and rescue units responding to civil disasters. In April, he lectured on Japanese foreign and security policy at the University of Nebraska.

People

Ford International Professor of Political Science **Ben Ross Schneider** gave a talk “Delicate Dynamic: Business, Government, and Industrial Policy in Latin America” at the conference on Productive Development Policy sponsored by the Secretariats of Finance and Economics, Mexico City in February. He also spoke on “Institutions, Politics, and Business Groups in Europe and the United States” at the conference on Business Groups in the West, Kyoto University in March. He gave book presentations on “Hierarchical Capitalism in Latin America” at Northwestern University in January, Harvard University in February, and at a book panel at the Midwest Political Science Association meeting in Chicago in April.

Associate Professor of Political Science **David A. Singer** became an Associate Editor of *International Studies Quarterly*, the flagship journal of the *International Studies Association*. In March, he discussed the political economy of banking crises at the “Political Economy of Systemic Risk” conference at the London School of Economics.

Ford Professor of Political Science **Kathleen Thelen** was awarded an honorary degree (*doctor honoris causa*) by the Vrije Universiteit of Amsterdam, The Netherlands.

PhD Candidate **Alec Worsnop** presented “Organization and Community: Determinants of Insurgent Military Effectiveness” at the International Studies Association Annual Convention in Toronto in March. He received a World Politics and Statecraft Fellowship from the Smith Richardson Foundation for field research in Vietnam during the summer of 2014.

Published

Noel Anderson, PhD candidate

“Peacekeepers Fighting a Counterinsurgency Campaign: A Net Assessment of the African Union Mission in Somalia,” has been accepted for publication in *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism*.

Christian Caryl, CIS Senior Fellow

“Imagining Invasion on Vladimir Putin’s Doorstep,” *Foreign Policy.com*, April 14, 2014.

M. Taylor Fravel, Associate Professor of Political Science

“Chinese signaling in the East China Sea?” (with Alastair Iain Johnston), *The Washington Post*, April 12, 2014

Jeanne Guillemin, CIS Affiliate with the Security Studies Program

“Taking Lives: An Intellectual Confronts the Problem of Genocide” *Journal of Scholarly Publishing*, Special Issue: “Remembering Irving Louis Horowitz,” July 2014, Vol 45, No 4, 373-379.

Peter Krause, SSP Alumnus

“The Structure of Success: How the Internal Distribution of Power Drives Armed Group Behavior and National Movement Effectiveness,” *International Security* 38, no. 3 (Winter 2013/2014), 72–116.

Sameer Lalwani, PhD Candidate

Countering Others' Insurgencies: Understanding U.S. Small-Footprint Interventions in Local Context (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2014).

Christine M. Leah Stanton Nuclear Fellow (with Robert Ayson),

“Missile Strategy in a Post-Nuclear World,” *Journal of Strategic Studies* 37, no. 2 (January 2014).

“Let Asia Go Nuclear,” with **Harvey M. Sapolsky**, *National Interest*, April 14, 2014.

“U.S. Military Assistance to India: Building Partner Capacity?” Policy Report, S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Nanyang Technological University, Singapore, 2014.

Nicholas Miller, PhD Student

“Nuclear Dominoes: A Self-Defeating Prophecy?” *Security Studies* 23, no. 1 (Spring 2014), 33–73.

Vipin Narang, Assistant Professor of Political Science

“Why India must stay the nuclear hand,” *The Indian Express*, April 12, 2014.

Mansour Salsabili, Research Fellow

“Leave Iran’s Missiles Out of Nuclear Talks,” *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, March 16, 2014.

Harvey M. Sapolsky, Political Science Professor Emeritus

“Questions to Ask as we Shrink the Defense Industrial Base,” *The CIP Report*, April 2014, 10–11.

and Eugene Gholz, “End of the Line,” *The National Interest*, February 5, 2014.

EndNotes

Paul Staniland, SSP Alumnus

Networks of Rebellion: Explaining Insurgent Cohesion and Collapse (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 2014).

Kathleen Thelen Ford Professor of Political Science

Varieties of Liberalization and the New Politics of Social Solidarity (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2014).

Jim Walsh, SSP Research Associate

“Crimes Against Humanity: Why We Must Never Become Numb To The Phrase,” *WBUR: Cognoscenti*, February 21, 2014.

“The Ukrainian Paradox,” *WBUR: Cognoscenti*, March 21, 2014.

“When Your Work Suddenly Comes Home,” *WBUR: Cognoscenti*, April 17, 2014.

Former Prime Minister of Sri Lanka Joins MIT

The Center has selected Ranil Wickremesinghe, a former prime minister of Sri Lanka, as a Robert E. Wilhelm fellow. The Sri Lankan politician and current leader of the Opposition in the Sri Lankan parliament was at CIS for one month beginning April 8, 2014.

Wickremesinghe was prime minister of Sri Lanka twice, from May 7, 1993 to August 19, 1994 and from December 9, 2001 to April 6, 2004. A member of the United National Party he was appointed party leader in November 1994.

During his time at MIT, Wickremesinghe studied how to formulate a constitution sans an executive presidency. He worked with faculty and students interested in Asian regional issues. And he was a featured speaker at a Starr Forum, "Indian Ocean: The Vortex of Destiny." ■



Ranil Wickremesinghe
Photo courtesy Wikipedia Commons

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